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FORMAL LOGIC AND LOGICAL FORM 
Last year Dr. F. C. S. Schiller published Formal Logic, a 
Scientific and Social Problem,-a critical text-book, he calls it 
in the preface, that will teach logic" in a critical spirit and with a 
minimum of pedantry and reverence for forms." This object 
is so thoroughly fulfilled-at the end of the four hundred pages the 
criticism has been so searching and insistent and the reverence 
for forms so truly a minimum that formal logic seems to be a 
complete ruin, and the only scientific problem left at the end is 
how men ever came to build it, and the only social problem what 
logicians will now do for a living. All that seems to be open to 
them is to act as guides for the curious who wish to inspect the 
remains of their subject. 
The thesis of the book Dr. Schiller has given in the preface: 
" It is not possible to abstract from the actual use of the logical 
material and to consider' forms of thought' in themselves, with-
out incurring thereby a total loss, not only of truth but also of 
meaning." It is necessary, he says, "to pull down the pseudo-
science of Formal Logic, and to show what an incoherent. worth-
less, and literally unmeaning structure it is. before it is possible 
to build up the true logic of real reasoning which starts from the 
act of thought and so does not lose touch with science and prac-
tical life. " The object of the attack is, then, the formalism of 
formal logic. The reader is led through a series of chapters that 
follow the headings of the traditional texts one by one, and under 
each is shown the difficulties attendant on the usual treatment 
of that department. Psychological analysis shows that terms, 
categories, and the formal theories of judgment do not describe 
any processes that actually appear in thinking or any elements of 
thinking. The traditional laws -of thought, the laws of identity, 
contradiction, and excluded middle cannot be taken as laws in 
the sense that we must think according to the forms which they 
set, for we usually fail of this. Nor will Dr. Schiller grant that 
they are laws which we ought to follow: when we say" A is A" 
we never mean the A's to be identical and it may tum out that 
the differences are essential to the purpose of the discussion. The 
third possibility that these laws are postulates is discussed with 
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peculiar results; logical laws used as postulates sometimes work 
and sometimes do not; whether we apply them or not rests with 
us and is dependent on our judgments. 
"The conclusion that the 'laws of thought' are postulates and neither 
facts in nature, nor even necessarily applicable to all reality, will perhaps be 
thought to reduce their truth to the level of (more or less) successful fictions. 
And certainly they are not' true' if it is the business of thought to correspond 
with reality. For they make no attempt to copy reality; they openly and 
'arbitrarily' idealise certain features in it, and demand that reality shall 
conform to these ideals, although it plainly never does. However convenient 
then they may be, they cannot be more than fictions." 
In treating the forms of judgment formal logic is mistaken 
in reducing anyone form to another or in treating them as 
equivalent. Something is always lost in the meaning of the 
reduced form; some shade or turn that the original judgment 
possessed does not appear in the equivalent form. Dr. Schiller 
makes a careful review of the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism 
and finds fault with it on the old ground that either the conclusion 
is contained in the premises or it is not: if it is, there can be no 
use in drawing it, for it has been stated already; and if it is not, 
it cannot be inferred. Moreover the middle term in a syllogism 
is in practice always ambiguous because it occurs in two different 
contexts. That" All men love good stories" and" Smith is a 
man" does not make it necessary that Smith loves a good story 
directed at himself. 
As to the symbolic logic with which modern logicians are busy-
ing themselves, Dr. Schiller points out that it has all the faults 
of formalism in an exaggerated degree. What his criticism would 
have been had he taken time to discuss that branch of logic is not 
in much doubt. The late M. Poincare expressed the attitude of 
Schiller's school in his discussions with Mr. Bertrand Russell 
and M. Couturat. These logics are extensions of the Aristote-
lian doctrine made possible through the use of symbols. No 
symbol can have meaning in itself but only stands for what our 
interest and will make it. Moreover, M. Poincare has remarked, 
in every equation of the symbolic logic the two sides stand in 
the equational relation by virtue of definitions of their terms, and 
if for each term is substituted its definition we have bare 
tautologies. " Logic," he says, "is sterile unless fecundated by 
intuition." This is in effect the same as the criticism of the 
syllogism in Formal Logic. If the conclusion is contained in the 
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premises why is it repeated in the conclusion? And if it is not 
so contained, how can it be drawn? Logical theorems seem to 
take the form of vast memoranda. 
Writers of formal and symbolic logic have had little to say 
to these criticisms, as Dr. Schiller has noticed. Perhaps what 
dela ys the reply is that any man who seriously devotes himself 
to the intricacies of symbolic logic has little leisure or inclination 
to notice anything so inconsequential as a criticism of his subject. 
Criticism of his particular system will arouse his immediate 
interest, but he is apt to pay as little attention to the foundations 
of his subject as is the mathematician himself. There is a more 
serious reason why modem workers in symbolic logic should not 
feel called upon to reply to this literature of criticism whose main 
representative is Dr. Schiller's book. The truth is that the 
conception of logic which it attacks has been quietly discarded 
for some time, for so long a time that some of the younger men 
know it only as part of the history of the subject. That con-
ception is the notion that logic is the science of reasoning and that 
it has to do with the process of thought. To this fact Mr. 
Hoernle called the attention of Dr. Schiller, in a sagacious review 
of his book, and was answered by Schiller that the old opinion 
lingers still in most of the colleges and in other unexpected places. 
The answer is, in fact, quite justified, for Mr. Hoernle expresses 
it as his own opinion that formal logic is either the science of 
reasoning or "a mere propredeutic exercise. " 
But surely this opinion also has vanished from at least some 
quarters. There is another alternative that leaves logic meaning-
ful and still does not pretend that it deals with thought. That 
logic has failed as a science of thinking (for a science of thinking 
is no light adventure!) must surely be granted. It has long been 
cast up to the logician that we do not think in syllogisms; and the 
logician must now be prepared to take the stand that it is irrele-
vant to his subject whether or not we think in syllogisms. Per-
haps no logical form is ever used in actual thought. The school 
of idealistic logicians, from Hegel to Bosanquet, in using the 
terminology of formal logic for their theory of judgment, have 
made the vast assumption that the Scholastics made before them, 
namely, that because we find logical forms in argument we shall 
find those same forms in reasoning. With the same idea in mind, 
Dr. Schiller decides that since formal logic has nothing to do with 
the thought-process it is entirely void of meaning. This is not 
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so clear. M. Couturat has expressed the attitude of many 
logicians in saying that logic does not offer rules of thought but 
rules of demonstration. Perhaps he should not have used the 
word "demonstration, " which conveys the impression of the 
forcible conviction of an unwilling auditor, but should rather have 
said "rules of expression" or "rules for connected statement. " 
At any rate he is right in that logic does not offer rules for thought 
or reasoning. Only God and the psychologists know how we 
reason; but when we express our thoughts to others it must be 
done in a systematic fashion that is open to investigation. A 
logical form may occur in thought, but, as far as we know, its 
appearance there is accidental; that our thinking process is 
governed by logical laws, whether those of formal logic or of the 
neo-Hegelian psychological logic that has appropriated its 
language, falls short a whole world of being established. Judg-
ment, which these logicians call an act, and make the basis of 
the thinking process, is more nearly the result of an act which is 
in itself, as far as our knowledge goes, miraculous. At any rate 
in the non-metaphysical experience of ordinary humanity we do 
not pretend to predict what judgment is to follow what other 
on any theory of judgment. The only attempt to furnish a 
basis for such prediction has been the theory of the association 
of ideas, whose entire inefficiency Bradley holds up to public 
scorn. 
Theories of reasoning are not logic. Logic must find its field 
in statement which is open to the investigation of all in a way 
that knowledge is not. However we think, the expression of our 
thought must have connection and order, and the same rules of 
connection and order must be in at least two minds before there 
is any expression at all. Aristotle (better than his disrepute) 
made no attempt to find logic in a necessity of thought, but 
sought for it exactly as we must seek for it in that agreement be-
tween two speakers which must necessarily precede discussion. 
If a man means anything he must say something; if he will not 
speak he is no better than a vegetable. We can conceive a solitary 
thinker brewing his conclusions somehow, as sudden intuitions 
or chance associations; but when he is confronted with another 
thinker, and desires to communicate the results of his thought, 
he cannot reproduce the manner in which that thought arose, for 
it was probably unconscious, and if not illogical, at least innocent 
of logical connection. Communication is not thought. Mere 
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mention of the terms in the order in which they occur to the 
thinker will not reproduce in another an identical process of 
thought. There is necessary a connection, a schematisation, by 
which the recipient can order the elements called up by words 
and phrases which the thought had originally suggested. This 
connection is more than grammar, although it must be acquired 
with grammar and underlies grammar. Rather it is the whole 
body of rules of the game of talk, which, is the basis of com-
munication. Between us and men of an. entirely different cul-
ture, before any form of communication is set up, there cannot 
be said to be a common logic but only the vague foreshadowing 
of one. With the establishing of communication there grows a 
set of rules for intercourse. In such communication logic is 
crude and misunderstanding the rule. Between its vague be-
ginnings and the intercourse of two mathematicians, whose 
common grounds and agreements as to method are infinitely 
greater and more definite, there are all degrees of elaboration, 
in every stage of which the logic consists in the rules of inter-
course that the two parties to the discourse accept. 
When we take this view we immediately see that the axioms 
of logic are postulates. The law of excluded middle and its 
companions, the law of contradiction and the law of identity, are 
merely those agreements as to the nature and permanence, for 
discussion, of affirmation and negation, representing the funda-
mental rules of all ordinary intercourse and connected statement. 
But these are not postulates that we are to use or neglect as the 
spirit moves us or as Dr. Schiller would have us. They are the 
conditions of our being understood. The question whether 
they will bear analysis is irrelevant; we follow them in our speech, 
and we are socially bound to speak that way. We find them in 
statements because we carry them there, and if we do without 
them we do so at the risk of being unintelligible. A logic stands 
on the same footing as a geometry. We no longer speak, with 
Kant, of Euclidean Geometry as the geometry or as the method in 
which we must order experience, but as a method in which we 
may order experience. So our logic is not the order in which we 
must express ourselves but an order in which we may express 
ourselves; and other logics are conceivable if not practicable. 
Take, for instance, the law of identity, "A boy is a boy"; we 
know that two different boys are involved or we should not have 
taken the trouble to pronounce them the same. Perhaps if we 
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had started at a sufficiently early period we could have had for 
our first postulate "A boy is not a boy" with the understanding 
that they were really the same or we should not have troubled 
ourselves to call them different. Either postulate would give 
a form of expression. 
There must be formal rules if there is to be communication, 
and these rules constitute logic,-formallogic, if they have any 
formulation independent of individual situations. In fact 
. there should be nothing so terrifying about the word" formal. " 
Our use of words is itself formal. When we repeat a word we 
do not mean that the same situation is repeated but that our 
attention is on the sameness in situations and not their difference. 
The word is not the situation itself, it represents an abstraction 
from the situation and this abstraction is essentially formal in the 
worst sense of the word. We use formal grammar and logic 
because structure is as necessary to the expression of our thoughts 
as it is to the existence of physical bodies. 
Dr. Schiller's part in the successful rebellion against the ra-
tionalistic idea that we are in a world that is to be deduced from 
a number of self-evident axioms, or fundamental principles, has 
led him into this vigorous denunciation of logic because somehow 
logic seemed the stronghold and guarantee of axioms and the 
whole rationalistic standpoint. What he does not see is that 
logical postulates have the same standing as the postulates of 
geometry. Geometrical postulates cannot be discarded at will 
without discarding the geometry which they underlie and 
adopting another in its place; and though this may be done, yet 
it would be the end of advancement in all geometry if investi-
gators did not confine themselves to one set of postulates in the 
course of one argument. A tennis player could as well change at 
will the rules by which he plays. His penalty would be the 
wrath of the gallery; the penalty to violators of the rules of 
discourse would be complete misunderstanding. 
Logic is intimately connected with language. There is logic 
in the language of savages as well as in the most definite language 
of all, the symbolism of mathematics. We acquire our logic 
with our language. Our neighbour's small Katharine declares 
herself a little boy. "But you are not a boy, you are a girl," 
we answer; "you can't be both." Yet the rules of intercourse, 
affirmation, and negation, the relation of girl-not-boy and boy-
not-girl, had been acquired long ere this, or we could have spoken 
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to Katharine only in the monosyllables of the year before. We 
may call the principles of logic postulates, although we no more 
choose them than we choose the names of the beasts of the field 
or the sounds by which we indicate that we wish a room with 
a bath. The actual choice was a social event in which our in-
dividual will is as much concerned as in the selection of our 
anatomy. 
Nor, if it be granted that we must have a formal logic, need 
we be jealous of the standing of the Aristotelian theory of the 
syllogism. Dr. Schiller and many other logicians have collected 
instances of argument that is marvellously awkward if put into 
the form of Barbara and Disamis; and we must grant also that 
the Aristotelian forms can no longer be held complete and au-
thoritative merely because they have a kind of symmetry and 
finish when symbolised. The rules of Aristotle's logic served 
fairly well in the Athenian schools where the players in the game 
of dialectic were brought by common interest and respect for lead-
ers to obey those rules; but in modem discussions, between men 
of different nationalities and different training, they will hardly 
serve; Dr. Schiller is right to this extent. For in the first place, 
the ideal of a reduction of all forms of inference to a few forms 
has only academic interest,-and academic interest hyper-refined. 
The completeness of logic in the sense that all valid forms of 
inference can once for all be tabulated is a myth. Logic is no 
more to be completed than is geometry or life. New forms of 
inference will appear constantly; and the symbolic logic of to-day 
is tabulating forms that are not expressible in syllogisms. The 
formation of a general logic is hardly to be expected from the 
symbolists any more than from their predecessors; the task of 
formulating a logic that will serve for all human intercourse is as 
hopeless as the task of inventing a language that will serve all 
nations for all time. Only a few and these the most fundamental 
logical laws can find even a very general application. A half 
hour with a student of linguistics who has worked with American-
Indian languages will convince anyone that most of the concep-
tions of classical logic are i1?-applicable to a speech that very 
nearly lacks common nouns and tries to express in a word a 
situation that demands an English sentence. I t is more correct 
to talk of logics than of logic,-the logic of each distinct culture 
must have a different formulation. I t is with limitation of 
interest to a restricted field that the most complete logics arise. 
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In the sciences this condition has brought about specialised 
vocabularies and specialised structures for the use of those 
vocabularies; and the logic of scientific discourse becomes more 
complex as the method and structure of the science grow more and 
more definite. The logic of each science determines the place 
that new discoveries take in the body of that science; each of the 
sciences may have a method differing slightly from that of the 
others; though underlying them all we find the logic of common 
speech, whose few universal principles must be generally observed. 
Of these logics of the sciences the logic of mathematics is the 
only one that has been given symbolic formulation. The work 
of Peano and Russell was possible because of the abstract nature 
of the subject-matter itself which admitted the use of symbolic 
expression. It is not true that these symbolic logics are com-
pletely expressed in symbols or can be completely expressed in 
symbols, for there are principles necessary to govern the operation 
of the symbols that will forever remain outside symbolic state-
ment itself. In Russell's Principia Mathematica over fifty pages 
are necessary to explain the theory of types on which the logic 
is based. A number of paradoxes, to which the Scholastics 
devoted many volumes under the heading "Insolubilia,"-
propositions such as "Haec propositio est falsa," which being 
denied is true, and being affirmed, is false, led Russell to lay 
down the principle that no propositional function can have 
reference to itself in one of its own terms. I Now this principle 
must be taken as completely outside the logic for which it is 
assumed; for if it is within the logic, its reference to all proposi-
tions seems to include itself, and hence violate itself. To unravel 
this difficulty an elaborate theory is necessary before the logic 
can be well begun; and we can hardly feel that there can exist 
any truly symbolic logic in Russell's expansive understanding of 
the term. In every logic are innumerable difficulties that can 
be settled only by elaborate conventions-conventions of sym-
bolism in logics of that character, agreements of expression in 
those arising more simply from analysis of linguistic forms. 
Russell's logic may be adequate for the organisation of mathe-
matical science, but it is not a general logic. It would be entirely 
inadequate in governing a parliamentary debate, for example, or 
delimiting a biological species. I t abstracts from experience to 
I This identical solution is proposed by Paulus Venetus, Logica Pauli 
Veneti, Venetiis, 1654, p. 84. 
154 THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY 
the same great extent as does mathematics and is useful only in 
mathematics for just that reason. The logic of classes, proposi-
tions, and relations in Russell is fitted to express mathematical 
theorems and their coherence, but not to express the uses of such 
a sentence as, "I wish I were in the surf." If there exists such a 
thing as a general logic (for it has not yet been formulated) it is 
altogether indefinite and is probably not expressible in symbols. 
Nevertheless it must be formal if we mean by formal, as Dr. 
Schiller would have us, "abstracted from the use of the logical 
material." We may paraphrase the statement quoted at the 
beginning of this article in some such way as: "It is possible to 
abstract from the actual use of the logical material and to con-
sider' forms of statement' in themselves without incurring there-
by a total loss, either of truth or of meaning." The whole point 
lies in recognising that in expression we have the result of thought 
but not the thought itself, and if thought proves inscrutable we 
may still scrutinise statement. 
The laws of statement are none the less laws if we find no 
instances of them in thought. Perhaps no syllogism was ever 
made that would stand close analysis of its terms and maintain 
its form. Inspection would always show the middle term sus-
ceptible of different interpretations in its two different contexts. 
It is the essence of usable words to be ambiguous. But that 
need not be taken as an indictment of the syllogism as a form of 
statement; it has fulfilled its particular function, whatever may 
happen to it; it has not forced its conclusion on its auditors, but 
it has offered this conclusion in an intelligible form. Other per-
sons are not compelled to accept our individual conclusions; 
nor is it the function of language or of logic to force conviction. 
No party to an argument was ever forced to a conclusion that he 
was not willing to make,-forced, that is, by purely logical 
constraint. It is always possible to question premises ad infini-
tum-even though the questioners be fools. The function of 
the syllogism is to show a path of connection, not to lead one 
over that path. The idea of rigid proof in the sense that the 
forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is proved 
now and for all time and all men is meaningless. You can prove 
it only to one who has learned geometry, and learning geometry 
is in part accepting the rules of the mathematical game. Dis-
cussion is possible only where each is in turn a learner and 
endeavours to see the path the other has taken. If either 
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relinquishes his own path it is because the logical statement of 
the other gives him an insight that makes him able and willing 
to pronounce his own the worse way. 
With the idea of rigid proof we must give up also that awe of 
logical form that leads Professor Royce to believe that he has 
discovered absolute truth in propositions (his own pet instances 
of the Insolubilia) whose denial involves their assertion. Denial 
and assertion can occur only in a logical system and paradoxes 
of the Roycean type are merely evidence of logical postulates 
and definitions that will not work togethe,r. They are demands for 
careful definition, not cul-de-sacs of reason. Truth is either to 
be taken as accompanying certain logical forms, and so as being 
a formal matter; or it must be regarded. as far as logic is con-
cerned, as an accident of propositions. The latter hom of the 
dilemma is the choice of Russell, for whom, in consequence, truth 
represents no more than a feeling toward propositions, dictated 
by our interests and purposes; and he offers us as the true logic 
a mathematicised reasoning in which the forms of ordinary speech 
are hopelessly outlawed, while logical discourse becomes subject 
to forms so abstract and constricted that it must lose all con-
nection with life. Dr. Schiller, on the other hand, would leave 
discourse so free as to be innocent of all connection and unity; 
it would be the capricious eloquence of temperaments such as is 
his. and would inevitably result in a dispersion of rationality 
more conclusive than was ever the confusion of Babel. But 
between these extremes there should lie a logic that finds its 
laws in the actual communications of actual men, resting upon 
compacts of human reason, and involving definite forms of 
statement which must be and are observed even by writers so 
independent and persuasive as Dr. Schiller. 
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